From 7793fbbd21b46e0cdbeffee5c3abf38bcb25cdae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: QQ Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 22:40:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Import vendor/dsh-remote-ssh/tests/trust-fence.test.mjs --- .../dsh-remote-ssh/tests/trust-fence.test.mjs | 184 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 184 insertions(+) create mode 100644 vendor/dsh-remote-ssh/tests/trust-fence.test.mjs diff --git a/vendor/dsh-remote-ssh/tests/trust-fence.test.mjs b/vendor/dsh-remote-ssh/tests/trust-fence.test.mjs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a860de6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/dsh-remote-ssh/tests/trust-fence.test.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +// 浏览器信任判定回归测试(issue #12)。 +// +// 背景:isTrusted() 曾硬编码 loopback 白名单,非 loopback 访问(局域网 / 配对设备)下 +// 插件的 5 类路由全部 403,且无论何种原因都报 "missing x-requested-with header"。 +// 现在与 /api 网关、better-sidebar 的 fence 同源:Host 为 loopback 或命中宿主 +// ctx.webRuntime.trustedHosts(启动采样的局域网字面量 + --trusted-host)。 +// +// 三层: +// A. 纯 fence 语义(逐条对照 @deepseek-ai/dsh-client-connection 的 api-request-trust.ts) +// B. 组合行为:提取真实的 requestTrust,注入桩 trustedHosts 执行(verdict × 头校验) +// C. 接线:7 处调用点、软注入 webRuntime、按请求实时读取、文案区分原因 +import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs' + +const root = new URL('..', import.meta.url).pathname.replace(/^\/([A-Za-z]:)/, '$1') +const src = readFileSync(root + '/lib/index.js', 'utf8') + +function grab(text, name) { + const start = text.indexOf(name) + if (start < 0) throw new Error(name + ' not found') + const declStart = text.lastIndexOf('\n', start) + let i = text.indexOf('{', start) + let depth = 0 + for (; i < text.length; i++) { + if (text[i] === '{') depth++ + else if (text[i] === '}') { depth--; if (depth === 0) break } + } + return text.slice(declStart + 1, i + 1) +} + +const fence = new Function([ + grab(src, 'function parseAuthority'), + grab(src, 'function isLoopbackHostname'), + grab(src, 'function canonicalAuthority'), + grab(src, 'function isTrustedAuthority'), + grab(src, 'function hasRequestedWithHeader'), + grab(src, 'function trustVerdict'), + grab(src, 'function trustErrorMessage'), +].join('\n') + '\nreturn { parseAuthority, isLoopbackHostname, canonicalAuthority, isTrustedAuthority, hasRequestedWithHeader, trustVerdict, trustErrorMessage };')() + +let pass = 0, fail = 0 +const check = (cond, label) => { if (cond) { pass++; console.log(' ✓ ' + label) } else { fail++; console.log(' ✗ FAIL: ' + label) } } +const req = (headers) => ({ headers }) + +console.log('A1 · isLoopbackHostname') +{ + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('localhost') === true, 'localhost') + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('[::1]') === true, '[::1](IPv6 方括号形式)') + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('127.0.0.1') === true, '127.0.0.1') + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('127.1.2.3') === true, '127.x.x.x 整段') + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('0.0.0.0') === true, '0.0.0.0(本插件历史放行,注释已说明)') + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('128.0.0.1') === false, '128.0.0.1 不是 loopback') + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('127.0.0.256') === false, '越界段 127.0.0.256 不是 loopback') + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('192.0.2.10') === false, '局域网 IP 不是 loopback') + check(fence.isLoopbackHostname('example.com') === false, '域名不是 loopback') +} + +console.log('A2 · authority 解析与匹配(端口语义)') +{ + check(fence.parseAuthority('127.0.0.1:3080') instanceof URL, '可解析 authority') + check(fence.parseAuthority('bad host') === undefined, '不可解析 → undefined') + const url = fence.parseAuthority('192.0.2.10:3080') + check(fence.canonicalAuthority('192.0.2.10:3080', url) === '192.0.2.10:3080', '带端口 → hostname:port') + const url2 = fence.parseAuthority('192.0.2.10') + check(fence.canonicalAuthority('192.0.2.10', url2) === '192.0.2.10', '不带端口 → 仅 hostname') + check(fence.isTrustedAuthority(fence.parseAuthority('192.0.2.10:3080'), ['192.0.2.10:3080']) === true, '条目带端口:精确匹配') + check(fence.isTrustedAuthority(fence.parseAuthority('192.0.2.10:9999'), ['192.0.2.10:3080']) === false, '条目带端口:端口不符则拒绝') + check(fence.isTrustedAuthority(fence.parseAuthority('192.0.2.10:9999'), ['192.0.2.10']) === true, '条目不带端口:该主机任意端口都算') + check(fence.isTrustedAuthority(fence.parseAuthority('10.0.0.5:3080'), ['192.0.2.10:3080']) === false, '主机不符 → 拒绝') + check(fence.isTrustedAuthority(fence.parseAuthority('192.0.2.10:3080'), []) === false, '空信任列表 → 拒绝') + check(fence.isTrustedAuthority(fence.parseAuthority('192.0.2.10:3080'), ['not a host', '192.0.2.10:3080']) === true, '无效条目被跳过,有效条目仍命中') +} + +console.log('A3 · trustVerdict:issue #12 的验证矩阵') +{ + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080' }), []) === 'ok', 'Host 127.0.0.1:3080 → ok') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: 'localhost:3080' }), []) === 'ok', 'Host localhost:3080 → ok') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '192.0.2.10:3080' }), []) === 'bad-host', '局域网 IP 且无信任列表 → bad-host(原 bug)') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '192.0.2.10:3080' }), ['192.0.2.10:3080']) === 'ok', '局域网 IP + 宿主信任列表 → ok(修复)') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '192.0.2.10:3080' }), ['192.0.2.10']) === 'ok', '信任条目不带端口也可放行') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({}), []) === 'no-host', '无 Host → no-host') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: 'not a host' }), []) === 'bad-host', 'Host 不可解析 → bad-host') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }), []) === 'cross-site', 'cross-site 即便 loopback 也拒绝') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '192.0.2.10:3080', 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }), ['192.0.2.10:3080']) === 'cross-site', 'cross-site 即便可信主机也拒绝') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://127.0.0.1:3080' }), []) === 'ok', 'Origin 与 Host 一致 → ok') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://127.0.0.1' }), []) === 'ok', 'Origin 缺端口(Edge 151 序列化)仍 ok') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://evil.example' }), []) === 'bad-origin', 'Origin 不同 → bad-origin') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'null' }), []) === 'bad-origin', 'Origin: null(沙箱/file:)→ 拒绝') + check(fence.trustVerdict(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', origin: 'http://[::1]:3080' }), []) === 'bad-origin', 'Origin 主机名不同([::1] vs 127.0.0.1)→ 拒绝') +} + +console.log('A4 · 头校验与文案') +{ + check(fence.hasRequestedWithHeader(req({ 'x-requested-with': 'XMLHttpRequest' })) === true, '正确头 → true') + check(fence.hasRequestedWithHeader(req({ 'x-requested-with': ' XMLHttpRequest ' })) === true, '首尾空白容忍') + check(fence.hasRequestedWithHeader(req({})) === false, '缺头 → false') + check(fence.hasRequestedWithHeader(req({ 'x-requested-with': 'fetch' })) === false, '错误值 → false') + + const headerMsg = fence.trustErrorMessage('header') + const hostMsg = fence.trustErrorMessage('bad-host') + check(headerMsg === 'missing x-requested-with header', '缺头文案保持不变(客户端依赖它)') + check(hostMsg !== headerMsg && /untrusted host/.test(hostMsg), 'Host 被拒时不再误报「缺头」(issue #12 的误导点)') + check(/--trusted-host/.test(hostMsg), 'Host 文案给出官方放行手段(--trusted-host)') + check(/cross-site/.test(fence.trustErrorMessage('cross-site')), 'cross-site 文案可区分') + check(/origin/i.test(fence.trustErrorMessage('bad-origin')), 'origin 文案可区分') +} + +console.log('B · 组合行为:真实 requestTrust + 桩 trustedHosts') +{ + const requestTrustSrc = grab(src, 'function requestTrust') + const make = (trustedHosts) => new Function('trustVerdict', 'trustedHostsNow', 'hasRequestedWithHeader', + requestTrustSrc + '\nreturn requestTrust;')(fence.trustVerdict, () => trustedHosts, fence.hasRequestedWithHeader) + + const local = make([]) + check(local(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080', 'x-requested-with': 'XMLHttpRequest' }), true) === 'ok', '本机 + 带头 → ok') + check(local(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080' }), true) === 'header', '本机 + 缺头(需头路由)→ header') + check(local(req({ host: '127.0.0.1:3080' }), false) === 'ok', '本机 + 不需头路由 → ok') + + const lan = make(['192.0.2.10:3080']) + check(lan(req({ host: '192.0.2.10:3080', 'x-requested-with': 'XMLHttpRequest' }), true) === 'ok', '可信局域网 + 带头 → ok(修复目标)') + check(lan(req({ host: '192.0.2.10:3080' }), true) === 'header', '可信局域网 + 缺头 → 报 header(原因准确)') + check(lan(req({ host: '192.0.2.10:3080' }), false) === 'ok', '可信局域网(fs.* 等不需头路由)→ ok') + check(lan(req({ host: '10.1.1.1:3080', 'x-requested-with': 'XMLHttpRequest' }), true) === 'bad-host', '未列入信任列表的主机仍拒绝') + + // 实时读取:信任列表变化后无需重启(桩每次调用返回新值) + let live = [] + const liveTrust = new Function('trustVerdict', 'trustedHostsNow', 'hasRequestedWithHeader', + requestTrustSrc + '\nreturn requestTrust;')(fence.trustVerdict, () => live, fence.hasRequestedWithHeader) + const lanReq = req({ host: '192.0.2.10:3080' }) + check(liveTrust(lanReq, false) === 'bad-host', '信任列表为空 → 拒绝') + live = ['192.0.2.10:3080'] + check(liveTrust(lanReq, false) === 'ok', '信任列表被替换后立即生效(按请求实时读取)') +} + +console.log('B2 · 信任源本身:0.2.1-rc.1 的 webStartup 优先、旧 webRuntime 兜底') +{ + // 真实现切片:两个 face 的 let + 两次 ctx.inject + trustedHostsNow()。软注入是关键 —— 服务不在时 + // 不能阻塞插件挂载(0.2.1-rc.1 起 webRuntime 已被宿主整个移除)。 + const start = src.indexOf('let webStartupFace = null;') + const endMarker = src.indexOf('/** 一次请求的信任判定', start) + if (start < 0 || endMarker < 0) throw new Error('信任源切片未找到') + const slice = src.slice(start, endMarker) + const injected = [] + const build = (services) => new Function('ctx', slice + '\nreturn trustedHostsNow;')({ + inject: (deps, cb) => { injected.push(deps[0]); cb(services[deps[0]] === undefined ? undefined : { [deps[0]]: services[deps[0]] }) } + }) + + check(/ctx\.inject\(\["webStartup"\]/.test(slice) && /ctx\.inject\(\["webRuntime"\]/.test(slice), + '两个信任源都用软注入(新宿主走 webStartup,旧宿主走 webRuntime)') + check(injected.length === 0 || true, '软注入就绪') + + const both = build({ webStartup: { trustedHosts: ['192.0.2.10:3080'] }, webRuntime: { trustedHosts: ['198.51.100.7:3080'] } }) + check(JSON.stringify(both()) === JSON.stringify(['192.0.2.10:3080']), '两个都在 → 取 webStartup(0.2.1-rc.1 的真源)') + + const onlyOld = build({ webRuntime: { trustedHosts: ['198.51.100.7:3080'] } }) + check(JSON.stringify(onlyOld()) === JSON.stringify(['198.51.100.7:3080']), '只有旧服务 → 退回 webRuntime(老宿主不退化)') + + const onlyNew = build({ webStartup: { trustedHosts: ['203.0.113.9:3080'] } }) + check(JSON.stringify(onlyNew()) === JSON.stringify(['203.0.113.9:3080']), '只有新服务 → 用 webStartup(当前 0.2.1-rc.1 桌面端形态)') + + const neither = build({}) + check(Array.isArray(neither()) && neither().length === 0, '两者都没有 → 空列表(loopback-only,插件照常挂载)') + + const broken = build({ webStartup: { trustedHosts: 'not-an-array' }, webRuntime: { trustedHosts: ['192.0.2.10:3080'] } }) + check(JSON.stringify(broken()) === JSON.stringify(['192.0.2.10:3080']), '新服务值形状不对 → 退回旧服务(不抛错)') +} + +console.log('C · 接线') +{ + const callSites = (src.match(/= requestTrust\(req,/g) || []).length + check(callSites === 7, `7 处调用点全部改用 requestTrust(实际 ${callSites};2.4.18 open.external、2.4.45 /remote-ssh/write)`) + check(!/!isTrusted\(req/.test(src), '不再有旧 isTrusted(req) 布尔调用') + check(/ctx\.inject\(\["webRuntime"\]/.test(src), '软注入 webRuntime(缺失时退回 loopback-only,插件仍可挂载)') + check(/function trustedHostsNow\(\)[\s\S]{0,220}webRuntimeFace/.test(src), '按请求读取 webRuntime.trustedHosts') + check(/webRuntimeFace && webRuntimeFace\.trustedHosts/.test(src), '实时读服务值(可被替换)') + const denyCount = (src.match(/denyRequest\(res, \w+Trust\)/g) || []).length + check(denyCount === 6, `6 个 JSON 路由用 denyRequest 输出准确原因(实际 ${denyCount};2.4.45 /remote-ssh/write)`) + check(/res\.end\(trustErrorMessage\(fileTrust\)\)/.test(src), '/sidebar/file 的纯文本 403 也带准确原因') + check(/code: reason === "header" \? "csrf" : "forbidden"/.test(src), '错误码保持兼容(缺头 csrf / 其余 forbidden)') + check(/issue #12/.test(src), '代码注释记录了 issue 编号与同源说明') + check(/api-request-trust\.ts/.test(src), '注释标明逐条对照的上游实现(可追溯)') +} + +console.log(`\n结果: ${pass} 通过, ${fail} 失败`) +process.exit(fail ? 1 : 0)